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A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LITIGATION
IN BASEBALL
DR. RICHARD L. IRwIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Commentators have recently identified a lack of needed research con-
cerning the history of sports law. More specifically, an analysis of the ori-
gins of the entanglement of sports and litigation throughout history, as well
as the manner by which sports have been governed by judicial law and in-
ternal regulation is required. In an effort to respond to this need, this paper
will trace and analyze historical litigation in the sport of professional
baseball.
Legal issues in sports generally revolve around three areas: contract
law, antitrust law, and labor law.' In general, baseball's litigation history
follows this very path while adding a few legal interpretations specific only
to the game of baseball. A comprehensive case analysis will attempt to
demonstrate the various challenges brought against organized baseball, the
primary issues involved in the challenges, and how the results have im-
pacted professional baseball.
Baseball, with its lengthy professional history in the United States, pro-
vides an ample volume of case review of legal concepts and their interrela-
tionship with sports. Faced with litigation practically from its inception,
professional baseball has received its share of notoriety in the courtroom.
Baseball seems to have conspicuously received favored judicial status possi-
bly due to its status as a "national institution." 2 On the other hand, because
professional baseball embedded its roots in American culture at such an
early stage, it may be that this forerunner status helped assist the baseball
system in future litigated matters.
In any event, there exists two distinct, historical eras in the development
of sports litigation: 1) 1890-1922, and 2) post World War II.3 This frag-
mentation of history applies to baseball litigation as well. As seen in this
paper's case review, the first period, 1890-1922, dealt primarily with con-
tract law and how court interpretations affected baseball's attempts to re-
1. R BERRY & G. WONG, I LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 66 (1986)
[hereinafter BERRY & WONG].
2. B. SPEARS & R. SWANSON, HISTORY OF SPORT AND PHYSIcAL ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 198 (3rd ed. 1988) [hereinafter SPEARS & SWANSON].
3. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 66.
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strict player movement as well as monumental antitrust litigation.4 The
second period - post World War II - involved continued proceedings re-
garding alleged antitrust violations; and a relationship with labor issues,
such as collective bargaining and arbitration, emerged. Throughout both
periods, baseball continued to be the exception to antitrust law applications
in professional sports. Although various other legal principles were liti-
gated in baseball, the issues predominantly litigated were those set forth
above.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SPORTS LITIGATION - FIRST ERA: 1890-1922
Contract law disputes were the catalyst for early baseball litigation.5
The primary issue involved the inclusion of reserve clauses which enabled
employers to prevent an athlete from playing for another team.6 Further-
more, certain features, including the reserve clause, served to distinguish
baseball contracts from contracts of general employment.7
In the late 1800's and the early 1900's, a lack of mutuality was the legal
principle most frequently used by the courts in denying enforcement of
sports contracts.8 The provisions in question concerned a team's ability to
terminate the agreement at its discretion and at the same time bind the
player to a lengthy commitment. Players resented this affluent slavery and
wanted measures adopted to balance the power between themselves and the
owners.
9
The earliest litigation regarding the reserve clause appears to have oc-
curred in 1882.10 In that case, Pittsburgh catcher Charles Bennett refused
to submit to reservation and was sued by the club for breach of contract.
The court ruled in favor of Bennett holding that the contract lacked in
equity." Following Bennett's successful objection to the reservation rule,
however, little changed, players were reluctant to legally challenge the re-
serve clause.
Dissatisfaction with contract conditions led to a new organization, a
union of the players, known as the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball
4. Id. Even though the antitrust laws at that time did not apply to professional sports, at
least to baseball, initial inquiries into antitrust did set future course for the industry.
5. Id.
6. J. DWORKIN, OWNERS VERSUS PLAYERS: BASEBALL AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 44
(1981).
7. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 68-69.
8. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979) [hereinafter WEISTART &
LOWELL].
9. D. VOIGHT, I AMERICAN BASEBALL 155 (1966).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Players.12 The formation of this organization was the braintrust of John
Ward, a highly skilled player for the New York Giants. Ward, a 1885 grad-
uate from Columbia Law School, possessed the legal expertise to advise the
players of their contractual rights, as well as the charisma to spearhead
such an operation. 13
The Brotherhood became a reality in 1885, the same year Ward received
his degree from Columbia. He wanted players to know that a violation of
the reserve clause was not illegal or dishonest. Ward forecasted that if chal-
lenged in the courts, the league contracts, including the reserve clause,
would be lacking equity.14
A challenge to the reserve clause occurred again in 1890 when, through
Ward's persistence, the Players League was created.15 This unique develop-
ment in sports history was one in which the players attempted to form their
own league.' 6 The league was enticing to the players because it gave them
voice in management, eliminated the reserve clause, and offered them part
ownership in the member clubs.
The National League originally resorted to bribery to entice players to
stay as numerous players attempted to defect.17 While this approach re-
sulted in widespread success, the league owners also sought legal relief
against the league jumpers. However, the owners found the judicial system
a much greater challenge than had the players. S
As Ward attempted to lead his band of players to the new league, the
club owners sued to restrain the players from playing for any other team.
The New York Giants sought injunctive relief in Metropolitan Exhibition
Co. v. Ward'9 in order to maintain Ward's services for the upcoming
season.
The court sided with Ward, declaring that the contracts lacked mutual-
ity and definiteness. It felt that the language used within the contract was
too vague and uncertain with no fixed salary or definite conditions for the
reserved year. Additionally, the court cited a lack of mutuality within the
12. SPEARS & SWANSON, supra note 2, at 156.
13. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 156.
14. Id. at 155.
15. Id. at 157.
16. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 65.
17. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 162.
18. Id. at 163.
19. 9 N.Y.S. 779 (1890).
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contract. The plaintiffs had provisions to terminate the contract with only a
ten-day notice while the defendant was bound to the contract indefinitely. 20
The Giants were equally unsuccessful in Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v.
Ewing,21 where the Giants attempted to enjoin Buck Ewing from departing
for the Players League. Relying on Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward,'-
the court ruled in the defendant's favor. 3 In addition, the Giants' lack of
success in the courtroom proved very costly with legal fees alone totaling
$1 5,000.24
Other players, such as Bill Hallman, George Gore, Hardie Richardson,
and Tom Keefe, were equally successful in the courts.25 As prior court
decisions basically rendered the reserve clause ineffective, the players seem-
ingly had their emancipation from the owners' rule. The new league ap-
peared destined for survival and ready to compete with the National
League.
Unfortunately, due to poor management and undercutting by investors,
the Players League disbanded after only one season. 6 Players, including
Watd, were forced back to the National League without any recourse.
Having won the battle, the National League revised the league agreement
and included an "option to renew" clause, as opposed to the much
maligned reserve clause. 7
The next legal challenge to confront the National League was due to the
organization by Bancroft Johnson of the American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs in 1900.28 The American League was willing to battle the
National League for major league status. With the expiration of the Na-
tional Agreement in 1901, the American League felt free to entice the Na-
tional League players to greener pastures. 9
20. Id. at 781-83. The plaintiffs argued that the reserve clause bound Ward to play only for
their baseball team, as stated in the National Agreement. The court ruled that the reserve clause
did not apply because the newly formed Players League did not participate in the governance of
the National Agreement, and Ward was freed of his contractual obligation.
21. 42 F. Supp. 198, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
22. 9 N.Y.S. 779 (1890).
23. Ewing, 42 F. Supp. at 205.
24. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 164.
25. Id. at 163.
26. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 68-68.
27. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 168.
28. SPEARS & SWANSON, supra note 2, at 157. The National League had trouble with its
monopoly over major league baseball. Factionalism, disloyalty, distrust, and most of all, greedy
individualism by the owners, together with a tyrannical attitude towards the players, fans and
press, and a lack of firm leadership and organization, found the National League in serious trouble
by 1900. Id.
29. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 168.
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The highest regarded player who made an attempt to depart for the
American's Athletic franchise was Philadelphia Phillies second baseman,
Napoleon Laoie.31 The legal battle to retain Lajoie was well traveled and
quite lengthy. The case was tried in several different courts as well as sev-
eral different states in Philadelphia's attempt to restrain Lajoie from playing
in the American League.
In Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie,31 the plaintiffs, attempting to utilize
the reserve clause, sought injunctive relief to restrain Lajoie from breaking
his contract. Lajoie argued that the reserve clause violated his rights, while
the Phillies ownership argued it was an essential element of the game. The
lower court refused to issue an injunction due to the lack of mutuality and
uncertainty of the contract.a2 The court held that Lajoie's skills were not of
a unique or extraordinary nature for which Philadelphia would suffer ff it
lost.33
The lower court's ruling was overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.34 The Supreme Court granted injunctive relief to the plaintiff, ruling
that Lajoie did in fact have the necessary skills that would be impossible for
Philadelphia to replace and would cause the team irreparable harm. Addi-
tionally, the court stated that it viewed Lajoie as a draw for the public; his
loss would financially hinder the Philadelphia club.3"
Other state courts disagreed with the Lajoie decision. For example,
when Philadelphia attempted to obtain an injunction in Ohio, the court
found against the team.36 These rulings completely nullified the National
League's success in the Lajoie case.37 The American League, in securing
these victories, was gaining momentum and weakening the power of the
National League's reserve clause.38
Following the Lajoie decision, contract law moved away from the con-
cerns of mutuality of obligations in the player's contracts, focusing instead
30. Id. at 306.
31. 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
32. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 9B (1902).
33. 202 Pa. 51 A. 794.
34. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973.
35. Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 217, 52 A. at 974. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling affected
numerous players in the American League, including Lajoie's former Philadelphia teammates Bill
Bernhard and Chick Fraser.
The National League owners were encouraged by the Lajoie decision, and followed with legal
action seeking to reclaim some of their players. E. MURDOCK, BAN JOHNSON 54 (1982).
36. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 73.
37. E. MURDOCK, supra note 35, at 55.
38. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 306. The courts once again held the reserve clause to be
lacking in equity and mutuality and branded such control by the National League unjust. Id.
1991]
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on issues of uniqueness and irreparable harm.3 9 For example, in Brooklyn
Baseball Club v. McGuire," Brooklyn sued to recapture the services of
Jimmy McGuire, who had defected to the Detroit Club in the American
League. The court ruled that the evidence presented in no way demon-
strated that without the defendant's services, the Detroit Club would be
harmed, as McGuire did not possess abilities so peculiar that they could not
be performed by others in professional baseball.41
The players again failed to respond to the court's notice that the league
was operating on unsound ground. Rather than securing a strong player
representation to challenge these practices, the players exercised their cus-
tomary individualism in deciding to defect to the American League.42
Following three seasons of successful operation by the American
League, the National League owners, faced with rising costs and reduced
attendance, approached the American League to arrange a plan of accom-
modation.43 A National Agreement, regulating both the National and
American Leagues, was created in 1903. In establishing this National
Agreement, the parties placed a ten-year limit on their handiwork after
which the arrangement would be reviewed.'
The players were the real losers following the formation of the National
Agreement. From a legal standpoint, the agreement was a deliberate at-
tempt to enforce the reserve clause and to control the organizations without
outside interference.4 5 The reserve clause became embedded in a system
ruled by a three-man National Commission which consisted of the presi-
dent of each league and an at-large candidate.'
Ironically, with the National Agreement's ten-year expiration date ap-
proaching, organized baseball was preparing itself for the next series of
courtroom battles. In 1913, the Federal League began what appeared to be
low scale and short lived attempts to produce a competitive baseball
39. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 73; see also Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D.
Mich. 1914).
40. 116 F. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1902).
41. Id. at 783. The court stated: "The evidence adduced is by no means conclusive upon the
question whether the services which the defendant contracted to render were so unique and pecu-
liar that they could not be performed, and substantially as well, by others engaged in professional
baseball playing, who might easily be obtained to take his place. Id.
42. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 307.
43. SPEARS & SWANSON, supra note 2, at 157.
44. D. VOrIGr, supra note 9, at 309.
45. Id.
46. SPEARS & SWANSON, supra note 2, at 157-58.
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league.4' What transpired over the course of the Federal League's existence
was more litigation, culminating in perhaps the most resounding court deci-
sion in sport litigation history.
The Federal League respected the reserve clause during its premier sea-
son of 1913. Beginning in 1914, however, the Federals refused to honor the
clause in order to gain equality with the established leagues. This refusal
resulted in attempts by the Federal club owners to go after any players they
could obtain, regardless of players' contractual obligations.4"
The first legal battle involved Bill Killefer of the Philadelphia Phillies
who defected to the Chicago Federal Club and then attempted to return to
the Phillies. Charles Weegham, owner of the Chicago franchise, sought an
injunction to restrain Killefer, who had signed a Federal League contract,
from returning to the National League Club.4 9
The case of Weegham v. Killefer5 ° presented the court with two separate
issues: whether the initial contract with Philadelphia was valid in its reser-
vation of Killefer, and whether the plaintiff's conduct hindered his ability
to recover, if in fact the contract with Philadelphia was invalid.51
The original Philadelphia contract was found to be unenforceable due to
a lack of mutuality. The case spurned a new concept in sports litigation
known as the "Clean Hands" principle. This concept was used to bar
Weegham from retaining Killefer's services for his Chicago franchise. The
court found that even though Chicago knew that Killefer was under con-
tract with Philadelphia, the Chicago management induced him to sign a
contract by offering him more money.52 The court concluded that a basic
principle of equity is that good faith is required to bring suit and while the
plaintiff's conduct was not illegal, it was unethical in the eyes of the court.
This concept has since been defined as the "Clean Hands" principle of
equity.53
Interestingly, two players, Armando Marsans of Cincinnati and Hal
Chase of Chicago, made attempts to invoke the ten-day release clause, and
when the challenges were brought to court, the holdings directly contra-
47. E. MURDOCK, supra note 35, at 108. When the Federal League was initiated it did not
appear to be threatening because no potentially competitive league ever lasted more than a few
years, but by the close of the season became a clear threat to the other established leagues. Id.
48. Id. at 109.
49. Weeghamn v. Killefer, 215 F. 168, 169 (W.D. Mich. 1914).
50. 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914).
51. Id. at 170.
52. Id. at 172-73.
53. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 80-81.
1991]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
dicted each other.14 In Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans,5 5 the court
ruled that Marsans accepted the contract executed with Cincinnati, and
therefore, had waived any rights he may have had to mutuality. The court
stated that it is a settled rule of law that where a person agrees to render
services that are unique, the employee has agreed to a negative covenant.5 6
The negative covenant has been described as an agreement to prohibit the
use of a player's unique skills for another club or organization.57 In the
event a player attempts to violate the negative covenant, a court is empow-
ered to enjoin such action.58
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase59 provided a quite
different result, but more importantly, it served as the impetus for an issue
which was to be tested in the courts for the next seventy-five years. Chase
was the first challenge to baseball which involved the antitrust laws. Chi-
cago sought to enjoin Chase from jumping leagues. The defense for Chase
alleged, on the other hand, that the contract constituted an illegal restraint
of trade, and therefore, was a violation of the antitrust laws.'
The Supreme Court of New York ruled for the defendant and dissolved
the lower court's injunction." The court held that even though baseball
was not subject to federal laws, it would not enforce an injunction which
not only promoted a monopoly in contravention of common law, but which
also stifled personal liberty. 2
While the ruling appeared to jeopardize the hopes of invoking the fed-
eral antitrust laws against baseball, the legal status of the reserve clause had
been successfully challenged once again. This put the management of the
American and National Leagues in a difficult position as it sought to resist
further attempts by the Federal League to recruit their players.63
54. E. MURDOCK, supra note 35, at 113.
55. 216 F. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1914).
56. Id.
57. YASSER, TORTS AND SPORTS 152 (1985).
58. See, eg., Marsans, 216 F. 269.
59. 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914).
60. Id. at 15-16.
61. Id. at 20.
62. E. MURDOCK, supra note 35, at 109. Id. In addressing the defendant's antitrust allega-
tion, the court used a unique description of the professional sport of baseball, as well as a colorful
and candid interpretation of the monopolistic powers of organized baseball. The court stated:
"[Baseball is merely] an amusement, a sport, a game that clearly comes within the civil and crimi-
nal laws of the state." Chase 149 N.Y.S. at 17. However, the court also stated that baseball was
not a commodity of an article of merchandise subject to Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce, and therefore, was outside the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 16-17.
63. E. MURDOCK, supra note 35, at 109.
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The Federal League seemed to gain momentum much like the American
League had some fourteen years earlier in its attempt to be recognized on
an equal "major league" basis. Peace talks between the two factions were
initiated in August, 1914. 4 When the talks failed and the Federal League
faced increasing financial difficulties, the parties once again looked to the
courts."5 Even in the wake of Chase, the Federal League felt it would be
able to bring antitrust violations against organized baseball. Thus, in 1915,
the Federal League sued organized baseball and members of the National
Commission for conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the federal anti-
trust statutes.
66
U.S. District Judge Keneshaw Mountain Landis was assigned to hear
the dispute and there was little doubt that Judge Landis' demeanor demon-
strated a favoritism towards baseball.67 Although his decision was expected
rather quickly after the hearings concluded, weeks and then months passed
without a decision on the case. The two sides then initiated settlement
talks.6 Presumably, this was what Landis had hoped would happen during
his delay in rendering a decision. By the end of the year, a satisfactory
accommodation was made and the Federal League withdrew its antitrust
suit.6
9
The Federal Baltimore Club, however, felt it had not been satisfactorily
dealt with in the settlement agreement. The owners of the Baltimore Club
filed suit in the Federal District Court of Philadelphia in 1916, alleging that
organized baseball had conspired in restraint of trade. Anticipating an out
of court settlement, Baltimore withdrew its complaint.70
However, when Baltimore did not receive the anticipated settlement, it
again filed suit. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs71 eventually found its way to the United
States Supreme Court. Baltimore not only challenged the American and
National League, but also challenged former members of the now defunct
Federal League. Baltimore alleged that the defendants had entered into a
conspiracy to monopolize major league baseball. 2
64. Id. at ll0-111.
65. Id. at 114.
66. Id.
67. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 92.
68. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 316-17.
69. The accommodation with its accompanying mergers, buyouts, and trades, cost the parties
an estimated $10 million. E. MURDOCK, supra note 35, at 117.
70. Id.
71. 259 U.S. 200, (1922).
72. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at 207.
1991]
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The Supreme Court in keeping with the holding in Chase, ruled that
baseball was a local business not involved in interstate commerce, and
therefore, was not governed by the federal antitrust laws.73 Furthermore,
the Court held that baseball did not involve production, and therefore, was
not a subject of commerce subject to antitrust regulation.74
Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded a brief but monumental
case in sport litigation history. This, however, did not preclude parties
from attempting to challenge the status of baseball under federal antitrust
laws.
Following the Supreme Court's decision, the first era in sports litigation
ended (1890-1922). For the next quarter of a century, litigation involving
baseball was relatively limited. Additional challenges involving antitrust
issues as well as problems with labor again arose in the second era of sport
litigation (post World War II).
One other aspect of the first era of sports litigation deserves mention.
Organized baseball sought to stabilize its internal governance by selecting a
commissioner to replace the three member National Commission. Origi-
nally, it was felt that Ban Johnson, the founder and president of the Ameri-
can League would be the man for the job. However, because of internal
uneasiness regarding Johnson's executive powers, the owners looked else-
where for a commissioner. It was eventually decided that Judge Landis
should be appointed, as he had won the owner's respect with his favoritism
of baseball in the Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore case. Thus, in 1920,
Keneshaw Mountain Landis was chosen to become the first Commissioner
of baseball.7"
As Commissioner of baseball, one of Landis' first duties included deal-
ing with the "Black Sox" players of Chicago, who had been indicted for
fixing the 1919 World Series. The players had been acquitted in a grand
jury investigation when their confessions suspiciously disappeared. Despite
the acquittal, Landis banned the players for life from professional
baseball.76
During this interim period between the first and second eras of sport
litigation, Landis' authority as Commissioner was challenged in Milwaukee
American Association v. Landis.77 The owner of the Milwaukee club sought
an injunction against Landis based on his disapproval of a player transac-
73. Id. at 206-07.
74. Id. at 206.
75. D. VOIGHT, supra note 9, at 317.
76. SPEARS & SWANSON, supra note 2, at 195.
77. 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. I1. 1931).
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tion. The plaintiff owned several major and minor league clubs. He at-
tempted to conceal various transactions involving a player's movement
between his major to minor clubs, but Landis recognized that several im-
proprieties were occurring. Landis relieved the player of his contractual
obligations with Milwaukee, thereby declaring him a free agent. The Mil-
waukee organization felt Landis had exceeded his authority.78
The court denied the injunction and held that Landis had acted pru-
dently in his responsibilities. 9 This favorable ruling is credited with em-
powering future commissioners of baseball with generous internal authority
over the organization.
For almost a quarter of a century, baseball's involvement in judicial
matters was quite limited. It appears that other national matters of the time
were more important. In addition, Landis' firm hand reign as Commis-
sioner kept all parties in baseball happy. This inactivity would end with the
establishment of yet another rival baseball league.8"
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SPORTS LITIGATION - SECOND ERA:
POST WORLD WAR II
In 1946, the Mexican Pasquel brothers promoted a rival major league,
The Mexican League, and came to the United States offering large salaries
in an effort to lure players to their league. American owners responded by
blacklisting any player who chose to defect to the new league.8" American
owners returned to the courts in hopes of receiving legal support in this
situation.
In American League Baseball Club of New York Inc. v. Pasquel,2 the
New York Yankees sought an injunction against the Mexican League's in-
vasion. The injunction sought to restrain the Pasquel brothers from induc-
ing players presently under contract with the club from breaking their
contracts to play in the Mexican League. The court granted an injunction
finding that the Pasquel brothers had in fact acted maliciously and illegally.
The injunction prohibited any further contact with players presently under
contract with any professional baseball club.83
78. Id. at 300.
79. Id. at 304.
80. The only other interim case of record was Spencer v. Milton, 287 N.Y.S. 944, 159 Misc.
793 (1936). In Spencer, the plaintiff was denied injunctive relief against the defendant which
sought to restrain the latter from playing for any other ball club. The court denied relief based on
prior cases involving a lack of mutuality and a lack of irreparable harm. Id.
81. D. VoiGHT, AMERICAN BASEBALL 301 (1970).
82. 63 N.Y.S. 2d 537, 187 Misc. 230 (1946).
83. Id. at 539, 187 Misc. at 232-233.
1991]
MARQUETE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
The next issue involving the Mexican League dealt with a players's chal-
lenge to the blacklisting instituted by the American owners in their early
attempts to discourage defection. American players had soon learned that
the Mexican League was not to their liking and wanted to return to Ameri-
can baseball, however, the owners' blacklisting prevented players reentry to
the American Leagues." The first player to challenge the issue in the
courts was Dan Gardella, a former New York Giant."
It was felt at the time that this case could have overruled the antitrust
exemption in baseball if it had not been for Gardella's eagerness to settle the
issue. In Gardella v. Chandler,86 the plaintiff argued that the blacklisting of
players was a restraint of trade in violation of antitrust statutes. The Dis-
trict Court dismissed the case, but on appeal, the Second Circuit found that
the ruling in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore did not preclude further
proceedings.8
7
While offering differing opinions as to the status of baseball, especially
with regard to interstate commerce, the court implied it would be wise to
scrutinize the authority in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore. 8 It was
believed by many that Gardella would be the case to bring about the demise
of baseball's antitrust immunity. 9 This speculation was quickly squashed
when Gardella accepted an out of court settlement. Fearful of their posi-
tion, baseball executives rescinded the blacklists and issued amnesties to all
defectors.90
The next threat to baseball and its immunity from antitrust regulations
came in Toolson v. New York Yankees.91 This case reached the Supreme
Court and speculation as to its outcome was high after the promise gained
in the Gardella case. Unfortunately, this glimmer of hope faded rather
quickly. By a 7-2 majority vote, the Court stayed with the ruling in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore. Additionally, the Court felt that the lack of
Congressional action in regard to the matter meant that baseball should not
be subject to antitrust laws.92
84. D. VoIGHT, supra note 8, at 3011.
85. Id.
86. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1946).
87. Id. at 405.
88. Id. at 412.
89. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 8, at 483.
90. D. VoiGHT, supra note 9, at 301.
91. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
92. Id. at 356-57. In a dissenting opinion, Justices Burton and Read stated: "[B]y affirming
the present case based on (Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore] (we announce) that baseball in
1953 is not engaged in interstate commerce and we do not agree .... " Id. at 357-58. Due to the
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The decision in Toolson became authority for two subsequent cases,
Kowalski v. Chandler,93 and Corbett v. Chandler.94 These courts concluded
that Toolson mandated a decision in favor of the defendants. It was now
fully understood what the Supreme Court's position was and the lower
courts had to obey the precedent.9"
Ironically, in a case brought against professional football for antitrust
violations, the same immunity was not granted. The case of Radovich v.
NFL96 was tried to the Supreme Court, where the defendants claimed to be
protected from alleged antitrust violations by virtue of the court's decisions
in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore and Toolson. The Court refused to
apply either case and stated that had it been reviewing baseball for the first
time, baseball would not enjoy its current status of immunity.97
Thus, while all other professional sports organizations came within the
purview of the antitrust statutes, baseball continued to enjoy an immunity
to antitrust laws. Perhaps, if the early challenges in baseball had not been
brought to the high courts, baseball may not have found itself in such a
unique position.
Over the remaining course of baseball litigation, alleged antitrust viola-
tions would still be brought against baseball. 98 However, Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore and Toolson continued to make the antitrust exemption
impossible to penetrate. Many of the decisions though, affirmed the exemp-
tion with reluctance. For example, in Salerno v. American League of Pro-
fessional Clubs, the court stated "a differentiation between baseball and
other sports is 'unrealistic, inconsistent, and illogical.' ,9 The court ac-
travel, broadcasting, attendance, and minor league operations, the dissent felt baseball met the
interstate criterion required to exercise antitrust jurisdiction. Id.
93. 202 F.2d 413 (1953).
94. 202 F.2d 428 (1953).
95. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 8, at 485. The hope gained in Gardella had quickly
vanished based on the Toolson decision. Many took the Supreme Court's decision to present the
issue to Congress. Id. at 486.
96. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
97. Id. at 452.
98. Complainants included players, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); umpires, Salerno v.
American League, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970); municipal government, Wisconsin v. Milwaukee
Braves, Inc., 385 U.S. 990 (1966); Washington v. American League, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1972);
minor league clubs, Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, 282 F.2d 680 (9th
Cir. 1960); and owners, Charles 0. Finley, Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
The issues concerned such matters as the reserve clause, Flood, 407 U.S. 258; discrimination
due to unionization, Salerno, 429 F.2d 1003; club relocation, Wisconsin, 385 U.S. 990; new
franchise allocations; Washington, 460 F.2d 654; territorial rights compensation, Portland, 282
F.2d 680; and authority of the Commissioner, Finley, 569 F.2d 527.
99. Salerno, 429 F.2d at 1005.
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knowledged, however, that a change could only occur by action of the
Supreme Court or Congress.
A last legal shot at the reserve clause was attempted in Flood v. Kuhn."°
Curt Flood of the St. Louis Cardinals was disgruhtled over a recent trade.
The case had the potential of penetrating the baseball antitrust immunity
based on the fact that all other professional sports organizations were not
exempt.101 Furthermore, baseball's increasing involvement in interstate
commerce, player unionization, and the league's control over employment
opportunities was viewed as a means to destroy the foundation of the im-
munity. 10 2 The case was heard before the Supreme Court, thus giving it the
opportunity to overrule its earlier decision in Toolson.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court felt differently about the matter, and
instead affirmed the antitrust exemption for baseball. The court saw no
reason to overturn its decisions in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore and
Toolson when Congress had not acted to overturn those decisions."0
Accordingly, we adhere once again to Federal Baseball. We adhere
also to International Boxing 10 and Radovich 105 and their respective
applications to professional boxing and professional football. If
there is any inconsistency, or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency
and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by Congress, not
by the Court.10
6
Eventually, as a part of the 1970 Basic Agreement, the contract between
the Major League Players Association and the Major League Baseball
Player Relations Committee, impartial arbitration on internal grievances
was established.10 7 Consequently, the players were finally able to success-
fully challenge the long standing reserve clause through arbitration.
In a 1975 arbitration case involving pitchers Andy Messersmith of the
Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave NcNally of the Montreal Expos, a panel of
arbitrators headed by Peter Seitz heard the issue. Both Messersmith and
McNally had played the 1974 season without a new contract and felt that
upon the completion of the season they had fulfilled their contractual obli-
100. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
101. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 8, at 486.
102. Id at 486.
103. FLOOD, 407 U.S. at 285. After Toolson was decided, over fifty bIlls were introduced by
Congress into legislation, seeking to eliminate baseball's antitrust exemption. However, none of
the bills received final passage. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 100-07.
104. 358 U.S. 242 (1958).
105. 352 U.S. 445 (1956).
106. Id. at 284.
107. J. DWORKIN, OWNERS VERSUS PLAYERS 126 (1981).
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gations to their respective teams. 10 The arbitration panel was to determine
if this was a correct assertion. The panel did in fact rule in favor of the
players and declared them free agents for the 1975 season' 9 - thus estab-
lishing a means in which players could break the reserve clause.
The owners challenged the arbitrators' authority in the courts. In Kan-
sas City Royals Baseball Corporation v. Major League Baseball Player's As-
sociation,110 the owners were unsuccessful at seeking to have the arbitration
panel's decision overturned for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that
because the arbitration panel was established in collective bargaining be-
tween the parties it derived its jurisdictional authority from the agree-
ment. 111 The owners had, in effect, granted the panel authority by agreeing
to its establishment. The judges also relied upon a Supreme Court ruling
that did not enable courts to overturn an arbitrator's decision in labor
cases. 
112
Through negotiations, resulting in arbitration, the players now had their
freedom from the perpetual reserve clause. The Messersmith/McNally ar-
bitration decision has been called the players "Emancipation Proclama-
tion."'1 3 What could not be accomplished in over a half century of
antitrust litigation was secured by this one arbitration decision." 4
In 1976, the Basic Agreement granted veteran players a much stronger
bargaining position." 5 No longer would the reserve clause bind a player to
a team for the entire length of his career. This historic document ended a
century of owner control over player mobility, and its inception turned the
baseball world upside down."16
The hero of this turnaround in baseball player rights was Marvin Miller,
the Players Association's Executive Director. By his masterful use of the
labor laws and his charismatic leadership, he had given the players better
employment opportunities and a voice in governing matters."17
When players achieved free agency, and thus, the ability to market their
skills, their salaries escalated tremendously. By 1981, the average player's
salary had reached $150,000.18 With this open market of athletes, guide-
108. BERRY & WONG, supra note I at 407.
109. Id. at 414-15.
110. 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
111. Id. at 623.
112. Id. at 621.
113. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 407.
114. Id.
115. M. MARKHAM & P. TEPLrTZ, BASEBALL ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY 54 (1981).
116. D. VOIGHT, AMERICAN BASEBALL 215 (1983).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 356.
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lines were established to secure fairness in negotiating with unsigned
players.
The remaining professional baseball litigation involves challenges to the
Commissioner's authority brought by some high profile individuals in-
volved with the game. In 1977, owners had to be fined by the Commis-
sioner for tampering with potential free agents. Ted Turner, owner of the
Atlanta Braves, not only was fined, but was suspended and denied a draft
choice for the upcoming season. 119 Turner challenged the penalties im-
posed by the Commissioner in Atlanta National League Baseball Club v.
Kuhn.1 20 The court found for the commissioner on all issues except for the
denial of the draft choice. The court felt that this was an ultra vires act,
above the scope of the authority granted to the Commissioner. 121 While the
ruling favored Kuhn's actions, it severely discredited him."2
The authority of the commissioner was again challenged in Charles 0.
Finley, Co. v. Kuhn. 23 Finley, a longtime adversary of Kuhn, had at-
tempted to sell some of his high priced talent from the Oakland Athletics to
the Boston Red Sox. Kuhn blocked the sale, alleging that the sale was not
in the best interests of baseball. Finley challenged the action alleging that
Kuhn acted arbitrarily and capriciously, beyond his authority, and in viola-
tion of antitrust statutes.'24 The court ruled for Kuhn, although it recom-
mended that future internal disputes be resolved through arbitration. 2 '
Pete Rose, baseball's all-time hit producer, attempted to block Commis-
sioner Bart Giamatti's power to conduct a hearing regarding gambling alle-
gations levied against Rose. After receiving a temporary restraining order
from a sympathetic state court - enjoining the commissioner's office from
disciplining Rose - Giamatti successfully had the case reviewed in federal
court where the commissioner had a much stronger platform for argu-
ment. 126 Rose's request for the case to be remanded to the state court was
subsequently denied.'27
It appears that the issues argued in Rose v. Giamatti128 are relevant to
labor law principles in which an employer does in fact possess the right to
probe and take disciplinary action against an employee suspected of mis-
119. Id. at 312.
120. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
121. Id. at 1226.
122. D. VOIGHT, supra note 116, at 312.
123. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
124. Id. at 530-31.
125. Id. at 538-42.
126. Chambers, Pete's Fans Learn What Lawyers Do, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 11, 1988, at 13.
127. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp 924 (1989).
128. Id.
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conduct unless the charge violates a statute or a contract or constitutes a
tort. 2 9 The 26 major league ball clubs have satisfactorily empowered the
Commissioner with the authority to do just that, especially with respect to a
charge of gambling.'
30
Having been denied the opportunity to litigate the case in state court,
Rose elected to accept the commissioner's settlement proposal of a lifetime
ban from baseball as well as dropping litigation against the commis-
sioner.' 3 ' Apparently, faced with a limited legal foundation and historical
litigious success owned by baseball in federal court, Rose opted to take
"what the Commissioner offered."' 132 However, the legal fiasco had assisted
Rose by keeping him on the Cincinnati Reds payroll, enhancing his en-
dorsement potential, and serving as a camouflage against pending tax eva-
sion charges on his vast winnings. 131
The most recent victim of the commissioner's disciplinary powers,
George Steinbrenner, owner of the New York Yankees, was also cited for
actions deemed unbecoming to baseball. Steinbrenner's involvement with
admitted gambler Howard Spira13 1 lead commissioner Fay Vincent to order
the Yankee owner to reduce his majority partnership from 55 percent to
less than 50 percent as well as resign as general partner of the ballclub.131
On September 4, 1990, Vincent was subsequently sued by Leonard Klein-
man, the Yankees executive vice president, for trying to run him and Stein-
brenner out of baseball.1 36 The suit was apparently filed in an effort to stop
a disciplinary hearing regarding Kleinman's role in the Steinbrenner-Spira
conspiracy.131
And so concludes the second and final era of baseball litigation, the post
World War II years. The courtroom proceedings of this era were valuable
in shaping the future of professional baseball, especially as it pertained to
player rights in America. While the most encouraging development for
players and umpires resulted from labor relations and arbitration, the
courts eagerly stood by these decisions.
129. Cohen, Judge Should Strike Out Rose, MANHATrAN LAWYER, Aug. 22, 1989, at 10.
130. Chambers, supra note 126.
131. Lieber and Neff, An Idol Banned, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 4, 1989, at 29-30.
132. Frankel, Baseball Bets on Wi7lkie Farr Partner, THE AMERICAN LAWVYER, Oct. 1989, at
79.
133. Chambers, supra, note 26.
134. Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 1990, at 1.
135. Steinbrenner Stock Stays In Family, The Sporting News, Oct. 8, 1990, at 13.
136. See Supra note 134.
137. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Litigation most often resulted from competition of rival leagues. 138
Each new league attempting to establish their position in the baseball enter-
prise generally created chaos for organized baseball. Players generally prof-
ited from this rival league competition. Bidding wars, enticements, and
bribery have always benefitted the player's bank accounts and had the po-
tential to strengthen their rights. In most instances, their early failure to
capitalize on court decisions hindered baseball player's rights for almost a
century.
The modifications to the reserve clause have been one of the greatest
changes in the profession of baseball. The freedom of movement and bar-
gaining power have resulted in higher player compensation and greater
competition for player's rights.
The baseball antitrust exemption controversy may very well never be
settled. As a new commissioner, Fay Vincent will now have to contend
with this issue. Congress is growing impatient over the reluctance of base-
ball to expand and have established a Task Force on the Expansion of Ma-
jor League Baseball. Senate members also are strongly considering
introducing legislation repealing the sport's antitrust exemption. 139
It does appear that with America's love for the game that many have
become so enamored with its beauty and its joy that its imperfections are
often and easily overlooked. The "National Institute", has found itself
challenged in the courts numerous times, but generally seems to escape ir-
reparable harm by the skin of its teeth. Maybe Judge Landis with his pro-
crastination as well as the courts in 1914 and 1922 were moved by a
compelling force and did have an idea of how they were going to affect the
future of baseball and professional sport litigation after all. And just maybe
their decisions on this "gentlemen's game" should be judicially and legisla-
tively adhered to through perpetuity so that the only baseball ruling chal-
lenged is by grown men dressed like their players for the judgement of
"He's Out"!
138. BERRY & WONG, supra note 1, at 65-66.
139. Welling, Bernstein & Studghill, Professor Hardball, BuslEss WEEK, April 3, 1989,,at
85, 88.
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